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H.: Torts--Intervening Cause--Liability of Original Tortfeasor for Su
CASE COMMENTS

that the nature and extent of the risk are fully appreciated; and
second, that it is voluntarily incurred. It was formerly confined
by many courts to cases where a contractual relation existed.
That limitation is generally no longer regarded."
Thus, assumption of risk consists of a mental state of willingness and
knowledge, whereas contributory negligence is a matter of conduct.
Landrum v. Roddy, 148 Neb. 984, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1948); Peoples
Drug Stores v. Windham, 178 Md. 172, 12 A.2d 532 (1940).
Assumption of risk can arise out of contract by express agreement or may be implied from the action and conduct of the parties.
As there was no contractual relation in the principal case, then if
the defense existed it arose by implication. Professor Prosser states
that assumption of risk whether it be express or implied means:
"By entering freely and voluntarily into any relation or situation
which presents obvious danger, the plaintiff may be taken to accept
it and to agree that he will look out for himself and relieve the
defendant of responsibility." PnossER, ToRTs § 55 (2d ed. 1955).
It would seem, therefore, that this statement would be qualified to
the extent that if the defendant is guilty of gross negligence, the
plaintiff will not be held to have assumed the risk since gross negligence, in the ordinary case, is seldom anticipated, and it is clear that
unless it definitely appears from the plaintiff's words and conduct
that he does consent to relieve the defendant of his obligation to
act toward the plaintiff as a reasonable man he will not be held to
have assumed the risk. Ridgeway v. Yenny, 228 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d
581 (1944). Thus, since D's negligence in the principal case may
be said to have approached gross negligence, then it may be said P
did not assume the risk.
While the court reached a just verdict, the distinction between
D's two principal defenses could have been more clearly indicated.
G. H. A.

TORTS-hzTUvEnNG CAusE--LiBmr oF OmiNAL ToR'rFAsoR
FOR SUBSEQUENT DAmAGES TO PnOPERnTY BY A REPAiBM AN.-D char-

tered a barge from P, a barge owner. During the period of the

charter the barge was damaged through the negligence of D in navigating through ice floes encountered during a journey. P and D
agreed that the barge should be delivered to a drydock where it
was to be repaired. Five days after redelivery, while the barge
was being placed in drydock, cakes of ice became lodged, through
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the negligence of a third party, the drydock company, between the
scow bottom and the drydock. As a result, when the barge was
brought out of the water, ice penetrated the scows bottom causing
additional damage. P brought an action against D for all the damage to the barge. The District Court denied recovery against D
for the additional bottom and side damage. Held, that D was not
liable for the additional damages sustained by the barge during
the drydocking for repair, after the termination of the charter upon
redelivery, since such damage was not proximately caused by
the prior conceded negligence of the characters but rather by the
intervening negligence of the third party. Exner Sand & Gravel
Corp. v. Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp., 258 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1958).
Of all the problems dealing with causation in negligence cases,
the problem of intervening cause has perhaps presented the most
perplexing problem. A torifeasor is liable only for the damage or
injury proximately caused by his negligent act. Cleary Bros. v. Port
Reading R.R., 29 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1928). Where the negligent
act of a third party intervenes between the act of the original tortfeasor and the damage to the person or property of the plaintiff
the original wrongdoer will only be relieved of liability if such intervening cause could not reasonably have been foreseen; or as otherwise stated, if the intervention was one which was not the normal
incident of the risk created. PRossm, TO RTS § 49 (2d ed. 1955);
Cleary Bros. v. Port Reading R.R., supra. In the instant case, the
court in applying the tests of legal causation to the facts, held that
there was no such causal relationship between D's negligence and
the damage which occurred when the barge was being repaired
at the drydock which would fasten legal liability on D. In so holding the court rejected P's contention which was based on the
proposition that a defendant who has wrongfully caused personal
injuries is liable for any aggravation thereof, immediately caused,
negligently or otherwise, by a physician in the treatment of injuries.
Lane v. Southern R.R., 193 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926); Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 Atl. 107 (1937). The court makes a
distinction between those situations where personal injuries necessitating treatment by a doctor were caused by a defendant, and
the situation involving repairs to property. The basis for distinguishing cases involving intervening negligence of a third party
resulting in personal injury and those resulting in property damage
is that the risk of aggravated personal injury is inherent in the
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services of a physician and it is readily foreseeable that such services
will be forthcoming when persons are injured; however, when property has been damaged, the risk of "human fallibility" is not normally recognized as inherent in the services of a repairman. Pound,
Causation,67 YAIE L.J. 1, 13 (1957).
The majority of the court relies on the decision in Cleary Bros.
v. Port Reading R.R., supra, for the proposition that "ordinarily the
first wrongdoer is not held responsible for damages which result
both from his own negligence and that of a subsequently intervening third party, unless the latter's negligence was such as the
first wrongdoer might reasonably have expected to occur."
In the Lane case, supra, the court applied the general rule that
the wrongdoer is liable for any injury which is the natural and
probable consequence of his misconduct, and permitted damages
upon the principle that when an intervening act is made necessary
by the act of the wrongdoer, he is liable for additional damages
resulting therefrom, upon the theory that such damages are the
natural and probable consequences of his act.
West Virginia, in Washington v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 17 W. Va.
190 (1880), has recognized that in cases where the causal connection between the first act of negligence and the injury is broken by
the intervention of the act of a responsible third party, there is no
right of action against the original wrongdoer. On the other hand,
in those cases where a person has been injured by the negligence
of another and the injuries are subsequently aggravated by the
negligent or improper treatment of a physician, the original wrongdoer who caused the injury is liable for the resulting damage. In
such case the negligence of the wrongdoer in causing the original
injury is regarded as the proximate cause of all the resulting damage. Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W. Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949).
In the instant case, the dissenting opinion takes the view that
the risk of subsequent damage by treatment or repair is as inherent
in the situation involving property damaged by an original wrongdoer as in those cases involving personal injuries. The rationale of
the decisions which have held the original negligent tortfeasor liable
for injuries by treatment has been set forth in the Makarenko case,
supra, wherein the view was advanced that the improper medical
treatment is a result which should reasonably have been anticipated
by the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer is presumed to know that medical treatment is necessary to the recovery of an injured person and
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is chargeable for the hazards of such services. The aggravation
caused by the unskillful treatment 'of a doctor would not have
occurred if there had been no original injury and the aggravation
is regarded as the proximate result which naturally flows from the
original injury.
It is possible that the instant case may be cited as affirming
a limitation on the liability of the original tortfeasor for the subsequent repair of property. The problem of causation is one of
ascertaining the ambit of the risk created by the defendant. Pound,
Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1957). In the Cleary case, supra, the
court recognized that it is the probability of the occurrence of the
intervention of another conscious agent which is material. It is submitted that the test of liability should be foreseeability of the intervention and not whether it involves personal injury or property
damage.
A. G. H.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
CONFmicr OF LAws-FULL FArrH AND CREDrr-JUDGMENT OF A

Sis= STAT.-DS, West Virginia residents, in purchasing a house

trailer, had given P, a Pennsylvania corporation, a promissory note
authorizing a confession of judgment in the event of a default of
payment. When Ds became delinquent in an installment, P's agent
requested that Ds sign a release on the trailer, and he orally promised
that such release would end the transaction between the parties.
After obtaining the signatures, P brought an action in Pennsylvania
on the note, and obtained a judgment against Ds pursuant to the provisions of the note. P then instituted an action in debt on the judgment in West Virginia. Upon the court's refusal to give the judgment
full faith and credit under U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4, because the judgment had been obtained through fraud, P appealed. Held, that a
judgment in a court of record of a sister state will not be given full
faith and credit where it is shown that the judgment was procured
through fraud. Consumer Credit Co. v. Bowerg, 104 S.E.2d 869
(W. Va. 1958).
The full faith and credit clause does not preclude a court from
impeaching the validity of the judgment of a sister state. Grover v.
Baker Sewing Machine Co., 137 U.S. 287 (1897); Bonnet-Brawn
Sales Service v. Utt, 323 Mo. 589, 19 S.W.2d 888 (1929).
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